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There is a consensus that decentralization by devolution leads to improved service delivery, but 
debate on the appropriate type of personnel arrangements for delivering decentralized services is far 
from over. Put differently, the discourse on whether civil service management should be decentralized 
or devolved still rages on. Little wonder that countries which started off with decentralized civil 
service management models in the 1990s are currently centralizing some aspects of personnel 
management while others are having centralized and decentralized personnel arrangements 
operating side by side in sub-national governments. The paper argues that civil service management 
should be decentralized whenever a country chooses the path of decentralization by devolution. Using 
Uganda’s example, the paper highlights two major challenges of managing the civil service under 
separate personnel arrangements: civil service appointments devoid of merit, and the perennial 
failure to attract and retain qualified human resource. The paper presents proposals on how to ensure 
meritocracy in appointments and how to bolster attraction and retention of human capital in local 
governments.  
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1. Introduction  
The aim of the paper is to explore the degree to which local governments in Uganda comply with 
standards pertaining to recruitment and selection of civil servants; and the implications of local 
governments’ level of compliance with recruitment and selection standards on good governance, 
bureaucratic capability and service delivery. Based on the findings, the paper makes recommendations 
aimed at ensuring adherence to recruitment and selection standards enshrined in the existing legal and 
policy frameworks. Data for the paper was collected by conducting in-depth interviews with three 
long serving district chief executive officers (chief administrative officers) in March 2010. Secondary 
data was collected by reviewing newspapers, government report and research reports. Content 
analysis technique was used to analyse the data.  
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2. Personnel systems in local governments 
The literature suggests that decentralization is a spectrum rather than a single state, ranging from 
deconcentration to delegation to devolution. Key features of the civil service tend to vary with the 
degree of administrative decentralization. When a country chooses deconcentration, provider staff 
working at local level are employees of and accountable to the centre, usually through their respective 
ministries.  Under decentralization by delegation providers could be employees of central or local 
government, but the centre typically defines pay and employment conditions. With devolution, 
providers are employees of local government but the central government may establish standards and 
procedures for hiring and managing staff (World Bank, 2003). However, even with decentralization 
by devolution, some African states have opted for a centralized civil service management system or a 
largely decentralized civil service management system, operating side by side with a centralized or 
unified system for top public servants.   
Conceptually, there are three types of personnel systems for managing providers of decentralized 
services: integrated personnel system, unified personnel system and separate personnel system.  
In an integrated personnel system, local government is composed of central government civil 
servants (Lubanga, 1998: 69). The personnel of the central government and that of local government 
form part of the same service and transfers are possible both between local governments and to 
departments of central government (Maheshwari, 2011: 54). The system implies ‘deconcentration’ 
rather than ‘devolution’ of the civil service. One of the noticeable features of the integrated personnel 
system is that the dichotomy between central government cadres and those of local government is 
non-existent. Central government appoints and posts officers to local authorities to meet service 
delivery needs from the central pool. 
Various arguments have been advanced in favour of retaining the management of human resources at 
central government level. Crucial is the need to enforce minimum standards of qualifications for staff 
which for some services, such as education and health, particularly important (Aslam et al, 2010). 
Green (2005) has identified additional arguments for central government involvement in staffing 
matters at local government level. First, keeping local civil services under the umbrella of central 
discretion can ensure some standardization in working conditions across the country. Without this, 
local governments in poorer and remote areas may find it an uphill task to compete against richer 
areas and national coverage of public services may suffer. Second, central government involvement in 
staffing may expand civil servants’ career paths by opening channels between local and central 
employment.  
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Public choice theory advances additional reasons for reluctance of the central government to grant 
local government autonomy in the management of human resources. Granting administrative 
autonomy to local governments in recruitment and management of staff means reallocation of jobs 
and consequently power, geographically and institutionally. In this regard, bureaucracies and power 
holders in the status quo, prior to decentralization, tend to resist human resource management reforms 
as they stand to lose prestige. This resistance is particularly pronounced where bureaucracies remain 
with the central executive and political allegiances.  
Central authorities may also see decentralization as an opportunity to appoint a dependable and 
proven individual who will ‘tow the party line’ and design and implement reforms according to 
national political interests rather than local ones. Jobs are an efficient medium for distribution of 
patronage (World Bank, 2009; Aslam et al, 2010). The integrated personnel arrangement is 
demonized by sub-national governments because it leads directly to control from central government 
and occasions a split between loyalties of senior officials managing decentralized services: their 
‘operational’ loyalty to local councils and their ‘career’ loyalty to central masters. If he/she has any 
ambition for his/her future, no officer is likely to defend the council’s interests where they clash with 
the ideas of a minister or central government. In addition, centralized structures are inherently 
incapable of satisfying local needs since; rarely do incentives exist for central government officials to 
perceive citizens as their clientele (Lubanga, 1998: 70).  
In a separate personnel system, each local government acts as a completely autonomous employer 
(Mawhood, 1983). In principle, each local government appoints and administers personnel who are 
not automatically transferable to another jurisdiction (Maheshwari, 2011). The separate personnel 
framework is preferred under decentralization by devolution because:  
(a) It keeps the employees’ loyalty unidirectional, that is, the employees’ loyalty is to the local 
government that has the right to hire and fire them. 
(b) Staff appointed locally would give quicker feedback opportunity and articulation since they are 
appointed to meet their employer’s developmental needs, and proximity would; therefore make 
them more responsive and accountable to their constituents through the elected local leadership 
(Kakumba, 2008: 98). This is unlikely in integrated personnel systems where dual allegiance is 
the order of the day especially for senior officials. 
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In the separate personnel system, some common arrangement is needed to support the merit principle 
and establish a link with standards that apply in the national civil service. This can be done by 
enacting national laws and developing regulations. In some cases, a separate personnel system does 
not imply that terms and conditions of service of local government employees are different from those 
of central government employees. For instance in Uganda, Section 61(1) of the Local Government 
Act (Cap 243) (GoU, 1997: 5345) harmonizes the terms and conditions of local government 
employees with those central government employees by stating that, ‘The terms and conditions of 
service of local government staff shall conform to those prescribed by the Public Service Commission 
for the public service generally’. In some countries, terms and conditions of sub-national employees 
are different from those of central government bureaucrats. In Kenya, prior to the promulgation of the 
2010 Constitution, the terms and conditions of local government civil servants were different from 
those of the central government and were negotiated between local governments and trade unions 
(Steffensen et al, 2004). The separate personnel system is often faulted for localizing civil servants 
and sealing their fate in a rather closed system where their career progress could be easily suffocated 
in one locality (Kakumba, 2008).   
The unified personnel approach is a midway house between the extremes of integrated and separate 
personnel arrangements (Olowu, 2001:15). It is a personnel model in which some or all categories of 
personnel of local governments constitute a career service for the entire state (Maheshwari, 2005). In 
unified personnel arrangements, local government staff are employed locally but organized  
nationwide in a single civil service parallel to the central one (Mawhood, 1983). In typical unified 
systems, all local government civil servants are members of a national ‘local government civil 
service’ and are only transferable between local governments.  
Normally, a national body – a Local Government Service Commission – takes charge of the local 
government staff. The Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) does what the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) does for the national civil service. The rationale behind establishing an LGSC is 
to remove malpractice in civil service appointments that are inevitable under the separate personnel 
system.  The weakness with the unified personnel system is that senior local government staff are 
treated as central government staff (Olowu, 2001). A unified personnel system inhibits local 
government autonomy. It further results in the accountability and loyalty of local government being to 
the appointing authority instead of the council (Sharma, 2010). 
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As can be seen from the above, a separate personnel system is the most suitable arrangement for 
decentralization by devolution. It is superior to other personnel arrangements because it increases 
responsiveness, enhances the accountability of civil servants to elected leaders and overcomes 
challenges of dual allegiance by civil servants to central and local government masters. In practice, 
most African countries have two or more personnel systems operating side by side in local 
governments. In Uganda, local governments are administered under a largely separate personnel 
system and a partly an integrated one. In Malawi, senior management staff (District Commissioners 
and Directors) are appointed by the Local Government Service commission/Local Administration 
Service Committee (LACSOM) and serve under a unified personnel system.  
3. Uganda’s local government personnel system 
The decentralization policy in Uganda was launched in October 1992 with the first 13 pilot districts 
(Kakumba, 2008). The enactment of the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993 was 
intended to give a firm legal basis for the decentralization policy. Following the coming into force of 
the 1995 Constitution, the decentralization policy covered the entire country. Local governments were 
empowered as focal points in managing development and social service delivery (Nsibambi, 
1998:14). Number 11(iii) of national objectives and directive principles of state policy in the 
Constitution (1995:14) of Uganda states that,  
The state shall be guided by the principles of decentralization and devolution of 
governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best 
manage and direct their affairs. 
Under Uganda’s decentralization framework, the district is the highest level of local government. 
Below the district are lower local governments (municipalities, city divisions, town council and sub-
counties). The District Council is the highest political organ of local government and comprises the 
District Chairperson as the political head plus a number of councillors representing electoral areas of 
the district and interest groups. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) is the head of the district 
public service and also the accounting officer. The CAO is charged with implementing lawful council 
resolutions and central government decisions. 
Uganda’s decentralization experience is generally considered a success story in terms of its extent and 
impact (Ndegwa & Levy, 2003). The transfer of staff hiring and firing decisions to the district 
governments through the District Service Commissions was considered to be one of the cornerstones 
of Ugandan decentralization reforms (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002). Prior to civil service 
decentralization, local government officials were either seconded to local governments or placed in a 
unified personnel system for all local governments in the country (Olowu, 2001).  
Nabaho                                                                 Civil Service Management in Uganda 
CJLG December 2012 
80 
With the onset of decentralization, civil servants posted to the districts were formally transferred to 
local governments and separate District Service Commissions were set up to manage human resources 
in districts and local administrations. The right of DSCs to hire, fire and oversee district staff was 
anchored in the new Constitution (1995) and further consolidated in the Local Government Act 
(1997). Article 200(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (GoU 1995:101-102) and 
Sections 52 to 69 of  the Local Government Act (Cap 243)  (GoU, 1997: 5341-5350) provide the legal 
basis for a separate human resource management system whereby one District Service Commission 
(DSC) is constituted with a district-wide mandate to appoint persons to hold  or act in any office in the 
service  of  the district or urban council, including  the power to confirm appointments, to exercise 
disciplinary control over persons holding  or acting in such offices and to remove those persons from 
office.  Members of the DSC are appointed by the district council on the recommendation of the 
District Executive Committee, approval by central government’s Public Service Commission, to hold 
office for a period of four years, and are eligible for appointment for one more term. A member of the 
DSC may be removed from office by the district council after consultation with the Public Service 
Commission on grounds of inability to perform, misbehavior, misconduct, or incompetence. 
From 2006 – following a Constitutional amendment the previous year – Uganda has witnessed a wave 
of centralization of some elements of local government personnel administration. Presently, the power 
to hire and fire senior local government officials (Chief Administrative Officers, Deputy Chief 
Administrative Officers and Town Clerks of cities and municipalities) are in the hands of the central 
government’s Public Service Commission. The goal of centralizing the high level administrators was 
to improve accountability and enhance the performance of local governments (Manyak & Katono, 
2010). It was further intended to make senior staff more effective than if they were working under the 
patronage of local politicians (IGG, 2008). The centralization of heads of administration in districts, 
cities and municipalities constitutes a more fundamental threat to decentralization by devolution since 
it has cut the accountability link between elected councils and higher local governments. Similarly, 
critics of centralization of top administrators in local governments argue that Uganda erred by solving 
administrative problems in local governments through centralization, and argue that centralization 
would result in a snowball effect, where local accountability mechanisms become totally undermined. 
The country is yet to see whether their predictions would come true.   It can now be inferred that 
Uganda’s local government personnel system is now manifested in a separate personnel type, but 
with some aspects of an integrated personnel system. 
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While exercising their broad human resource management functions, DSCs are required to conform to 
standards established by the Public Service Commission for the Public Service generally. Section 
58(1) of the Local Government Act (Cap 243) (GoU 1997: 5343) insulates the DSC from any external 
influence by unequivocally stating that, ‘The District Service Commission shall be independent and 
shall not be subject to control or direction of any person or authority’. Section 56(1) [a]-[d] spells out 
the minimum qualifications for a member of the DSC: being ordinarily a resident of the district; being 
a person of high moral character and proven integrity; possessing a minimum of ten years working 
experience in a responsible position; and being in possession of a diploma qualification.  
Article 166(1) [d] and [e] gives the Public Service Commission the mandate to guide, coordinate and 
regulate the of the DSCs. Section 59(2) of the Local Government Act provides for people aggrieved 
by  decisions of the DSCs to appeal to the PSC. When one decides to appeal against the decision of 
the DSC to the PSC, then decision of the latter remains until the PSC has ruled over the matter.  
4. Challenges of managing local government staffing  
Local governments in Uganda experience several challenges in managing human resources. These 
challenges can be placed in two broad categories: breach of merit in appointment to civil service posts 
and inability to attract and retain human capital. These challenges are discussed below. 
i)    Breach of merit principles in recruitment in the district civil service 
Merit can simply be defined as appointment of the best person for any given job (United Nations, 
2005; McCourt, 2007).  The ‘best person’ definition implies the appointee is the best candidate; posts 
are open to all eligible candidates; and the appointment process is systematic, transparent and 
challengeable (McCourt, 2007: 3). The assumption fundamental to merit appointment is that the 
bureaucracy must be able to recruit the best possible personnel and in so doing promote effective 
government (Peters, 2001: 86-7). Lamentably, some local governments in Uganda practice merit-
based recruitment and selection more in theory than in practice. The cases below lend credence this 
observation. 
Discriminatory hiring practices  
Hiring practices that discriminate against eligible candidates fall short of merit. There is evidence to 
suggest that DSCs display discriminatory tendencies during the hiring of staff. Rather than appoint 
staff ‘for the district from the national labour market’, some DSCs appoint staff ‘for the district from 
the local/district labour market’. As a result, civil service ranks are filled with inept ‘sons and 
daughters of the soil’ (local home boys and girls).  Some DSCs advertise vacancies in national 
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newspapers to elicit responses from qualified candidates but the selection for vacant positions is 
usually from the local (district) labour markets.  Recruiting sons and daughters of the soil is a major 
challenge of personnel decentralization in Uganda. One CAO said, ‘job applicants from other districts 
are regarded persona non grata by DSCs’. In the National Integrity Survey of 2008, the Inspectorate 
of Government (IGG) found that DSCs had persistently chosen to recruit people from local areas and 
that the practice had limited opportunities for recruiting persons with relevant competences. 
Patronage appointments  
There is a strong perception that appointment in the district public service is based on patronage. In 
other words, ‘technical know-who’ rather than ‘technical know-how’ bolsters a candidate’s chances of 
being appointed in the district civil service. District councils and individual elected leaders operate 
from a distance to influence the selection decisions of the DSCs.  To illustrate the magnitude of the 
problem, one CAO said, ‘...the hand of the District Council is invisible and yet very powerful in 
almost every selection decision by the District Service Commissions’. These findings demonstrate that 
DSCs do not act independently of district councils, and corroborate findings from earlier studies. In 
Galiwango (2008: 209), one respondent (a senior civil servant in a district) is reported to have said: 
It is difficult to get a job in the district unless the councillors have talked to the chairperson 
[of the DSC]. The DSC is just a rubber stamp 
The findings are further consistent with Kakumba (2003) who concluded that DSCs in Uganda are 
externally influenced; and the Ministry of Public Service (2003: 3) that noted that ‘District Service 
Commissions tended to appoint staff recommended by politicians’.  
But what is it that sustains patronage in local governments? The single most important driver of 
patronage in recruitment and selection is the appointment arrangement for the DSC. As already 
pointed out, the DSC is virtually ‘appointed’ by the District Chairperson who presents names to the 
District Executive Committee that he/she appoints. None of the members of the executive can 
challenge the appointing authority (District Chairperson) for fear of being relieved of his/her duties. 
Asked about criteria district chairpersons consider to nominate persons to serve on the DSC, one 
respondent in Galiwango (2008:206) contended, thus: 
One cannot be appointed to…the DSC unless one was a campaign agent of the ruling 
[district] chairperson. It has become one way of appeasement and entrenchment for 
incumbents. 
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It therefore suffices to say that merit, more often than not, is not adhered to when appointing members 
of the DSC (Galiwango, 2008). The appointment arrangement devoid of merit means that members of 
the DSC must ‘dance to the tune’ of the appointing authority and/or local politicians. Hence, members 
of the DSC have tended to reciprocate to their appointing authority by offering jobs to relatives, 
friends and political supporters of members of the District Council. A member of the DSC is unlikely 
to secure a second term in office unless he/she has been serving the individual interests of local 
politicians in matters of recruitment and selection of civil servants.  To bolster their chances of 
securing a second term in office, some members of the DSC have no option but to succumb to the 
pressures from the appointing authority. In some cases, nomination and eventual appointment to serve 
on the DSC is heavily premised on the likelihood of nominees to be pliable rather that on their ability 
to execute the functions of the office. Statutory requirements such as high moral character and proven 
integrity seem to take a back seat while District Councils are nominating and subsequently appointing 
persons to serve on the DSCs.  
Second, the balkanization of the country into small and sometimes unviable tribal (ethnic) districts has 
promoted patronage in recruitment and selection. Uganda with a population of 33 million boasts of 
112 district local governments and plans are underway to create 21 more district. Asked whether the 
creation of new districts exacerbates patronage in recruitment and selection, one CAO said, ‘District 
are too small to the extent that almost everyone is related to the other’.  This means that with a small 
district, it is easier to have a patron.  
Commercialization of entry level positions 
Widespread corruption in Uganda has not spared member of DSCs. To infer that in some local 
governments civil service jobs are on the counter would not constitute an overstatement. ‘Buying’ 
jobs in some local governments seems to be the norm rather than an exception. The Inspectorate 
General of Government (IGG), in exercising powers conferred upon him by the Constitution and the 
Inspectorate of Government Act (2002), has investigated a multitude of cases involving bribery in 
recruitment and selection and consequently recommended termination of some appointed local 
government bureaucrats.  
In March 2010, the IGG ordered the Luweero District Service Commission to dismiss the town clerk 
of Wobulenzi town council over bribing the DSC to scoop a job! (The Daily Monitor, 19 March 
2010). According to the IGG, several applicants were confidentially contacted by some people 
[members of the DSC] to solicit bribes and only those who pledged the biggest bribe were short listed 
for the interviews. The IGG further contended that following the bribery, Mr Ssebudde was the only 
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person short listed for the post of town clerk and was automatically appointed. In this case, the major 
factor the DSC considered to offer the applicant a job was his ability to raise the highest bribe and not 
his ability to execute the functions of the office. In the New Vision 1 April 2010:10), the Regional 
Inspectorate Officer in the IGG’s  office, is quoted as saying that, ‘ In Amuru district, those who ask 
for jobs are told to pay bribes equal to three months salary of a civil servant’.  Offering bribes by 
public servants to get jobs in local governments will exacerbate corruption in local government since 
public officers who offer bribes to get jobs start their service life with corruption and have the logic 
and motivation to engage in the same throughout. Once a person accepts to offer a bribe to get a job, it 
means that that person does not define corruption as morally wrong and has a high likelihood of 
engaging in any form of corruption. 
Breach of minimum job specifications /standards 
Other irregularities in the recruitment process in districts involve breach of minimum specifications 
for jobs.  Every job in local government has a person specification to determine what kind of person is 
needed to perform the job effectively. These are minimum attributes, and not either average or 
maximum. Good human resource practice dictates that a person who does not meet the minimum 
requirements should not be considered for a job opening. District Service Commissions have blatantly 
breached minimum job specifications while short listing job applicants and making job offers.  DSCs 
have made irregular appointments in the district public service prompting aggrieved parties to invoke 
Section 59 of the Local Government Act and appeal to the Public Service Commission.  
Uganda’s print media regularly reports cases where the PSC and the Inspectorate of Government have 
directed DSCs to rescind appointments of district staff over lack of minimum qualifications. In April 
2010, the PSC ordered Abim District Service Commission to cancel the appointment of the District 
Education Officer (The New Vision 22 April 2010) and the appointment of five Mukono district  
employees over lack of required academic qualifications and experience (The New Vision 31 May 
2010). The chairperson of Mukono District Service Commission, is quoted as saying that, ‘those 
whose appointments would be cancelled because they lacked the academic qualifications at the time 
they got the jobs to re-apply when the jobs are re-advertised’ (New Vision 31 May 2010. When a 
district appoints someone who does not meet the minimum specifications, then that may result in 
giving the public an inferior service. This trend needs to be reversed so as to improve service delivery 
in local governments. 
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Breaching the merit principle is likely to have disastrous consequences on good governance and 
service delivery. There is no doubt that appointments based on patronage undermine the capacity of 
the bureaucracy; affect the integrity of the district civil service; and limit economic growth and 
therefore poverty reduction. Merit- based appointment has over time been associated with the quality 
and integrity of the civil service at various levels of government. It has been singled out as one of the 
major factors associated with low incidences of corruption in the implementing arm of government 
(World Bank, 1997: 16; United Nations, 2005: 80). It is being accepted in policy circles as an anti-
corruption strategy. Merit-based recruitment is further associated with economic growth. 
Bureaucracies with strong meritocratic tradition are associated with superior economic growth 
(Raunch & Evans, 2000). The ‘miracle’ era in East Asia is attributed, in part, to meritocratic selection. 
On whether irregularities in appointment affect performance of the district, all the three CAO’s 
answered in the affirmative. One of them said:  
What would you expect? The input affects the output. If you accept to let garbage in, then 
be prepared for garbage out. We are currently having so many incompetent public servants 
owing to politicization of recruitment and selection. 
The assertion of the CAO’s corroborate Therkildsen and Tidemand (2007) who noted that districts in 
Uganda that upheld merit principles performed better than those that had not. Hence, differences in 
performance across local governments can partly be attributed to merit-based recruitment and 
selection. 
ii)  Inability to attract and retain qualified staff  
Human capital in the form of qualified staff is one of the greatest assets to local governments. The 
availability of adequate and skilled human resources at the right time to carry out functions of local 
government is one of the key factors in the process of ensuring that service delivery takes place. 
Hence, attraction and retention of civil servants is integral to capacity and performance of local 
government (Jean et al, 2010). Local governments in Uganda face a perennial challenge of attracting 
and retaining adequate and skilled human resources. A number of local governments have unstaffed 
posts. Currently the staffing levels stand at 64.1% in urban authorities and 55.5% in the districts 
averaging at 59.8% of the approved establishment across the board (Amooti, 2010: 8). According to 
the Ministerial Policy Statement for the Ministry of Local Government (2010: 38), strategic positions 
in local governments were staffed to an average of 58%. The staffing gaps can be attributed to 
retention challenges and lack of resources to pay the appointees. Government now requires local 
governments to fill their establishments by 60% and provides financial resources for salaries. Several 
factors contribute to the failure by sub-national units to attract and retain staff, as follows. 
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Lack of autonomy over pay policy 
To be able to attract and retain qualified individuals, local governments must have something to offer 
through competitive pay and a range of other incentives.  Local governments are conferred the powers 
to hire and fire; and set local incentives but have no autonomy to set policy. Central government 
imposes salary levels, benefits and employment conditions. Local governments are required to adhere 
to a unified national salary scale, which represents a major constraint on local decision space. 
Restricting local government autonomy in determining wage rates was intended to ensure some 
standardization in the working conditions across the country.  
Low pay has contributed to the inability of local governments to attract and retain high quality staff. 
Few candidates are willing to work for available pay. Often, desirable civil servants are lured into 
private sector positions that provide more competitive salaries. Indeed, top performers are only able to 
commit a small number of years to local government service (Jean, et al, 2010). For instance, recently 
there has been an exodus of staff from local governments to well paying semi-autonomous 
government agencies and NGOs (Amooti, 2010: 8). Local governments can be rightly regarded as 
‘training grounds’ for central government and the private sector. To counter retention challenges, 
some local governments use their discretionary powers to set local incentives. Kanungu district pays a 
top-up allowance of 500,000 shillings to doctors on top of their basic salary (Jean et al, 2010).  Even 
if local governments were given autonomy to set wage rates, they would not afford to pay more than 
the national salary structure. Salaries of local government staff are paid from grants from the central 
government. 
Limited career opportunities  
The career paths of local government staff are limited compared to those of central government staff. 
Rigid local government structures limit promotion to a few levels. This limits career progression of 
staff. Hence, local government staff stays in the same position and at the same level for many years.  
Due to limited opportunities for career advancement, local government staff who wish to progress in 
their career, transfer to the central government or the private sector.   
Location of some districts  
Under Circular Standing Instruction No. 2 of 2010, the Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) designated 
24 out of 112 districts in Uganda as ‘hard-to-reach’. The concept encompasses the elements of being 
hard to stay and work in. Other dimensions of hard to reach include remoteness, insecurity and poor 
infrastructure. The remote nature of districts and poor road quality makes make access to/from the 
district time-consuming and challenging.  On top of being hard to reach, internet and power are 
frequently unstable and susceptible to prolonged outages. The nature of these districts dissuades 
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individuals from taking posts outside of urban areas and/or leads to staff retention problems. These 
local governments have consistently failed to attract and retain skilled and competent personnel, 
leading to gaps and inadequacies in the delivery of services (MoPS, 2010). To attract and retain staff 
in hard to reach areas, a ‘hard-to-reach framework’ comprising of short-term, long-term and long-term 
interventions. The strategies include payment of a hardship allowance (30% of the basic monthly 
salary), leave transport concession, transport allowance and provision of preferential training and 
career growth support, as well as targeted recruitment, construction of staff housing, improved 
planning of public investments, pay reform strategies, improvement of general infrastructure and 
sector specific initiatives. From July 2010, the government implemented two interventions: payment 
of hardship allowance and improvement of infrastructure in health facilities and schools. Under the 
implementation of modalities, payment of hardship allowance excludes public officers working in 
municipalities, town councils and headquarters of designated local governments. The efficacy of the 
two interventions is not yet known. 
5. Conclusions 
Uganda’s experience with the separate personnel system for local government, leads to the following 
conclusions. 
i. The way that a local government recruitment agency is constituted significantly influences how 
it acts. Evidence from Uganda lends credence to this proposition. DSCs that are constituted on 
narrow interests will be predisposed to serve narrow interests (serving interests of the 
appointing authority and not serving the interests of the district). Equally worth noting, a local 
government recruitment agency that is appointed in breach of merit principles is unlikely to 
appoint civil servants on merit. Given the relationship between merit appointment and service 
delivery, councils should appoint recruitment agencies on merit and DSCs should place the 
interests of the districts above those of individual council members. 
 
ii. With decentralization by devolution, the gap between law/policy and practice in civil service 
management in sub-national governments is inevitable. In Uganda, for example, domestic laws 
(Constitution and Local Government Act) guarantee the independence of the DSCs and further 
require DSCs to appoint staff on merit. But there is evidence that the DSCs are sometimes 
influenced by their appointing authority (District Councils) and some appointments in the local 
government civil service are devoid of merit. 
iii. Lack of merit-based civil service appointment undermines the capacity of the local government 
civil service to deliver services.  
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iv.  Decentralization by devolution and consequent decentralization of human resources may be 
construed as localisation of the labour market by recruitment agencies and elected leaders in 
local governments .This leads to the syndrome of ‘sons and daughters of the soil’. 
v. Local governments formed along ethnic lines heighten patronage and tribalism in recruitment 
and selection. This may undermine national unity.   
vi. Design of decentralization programmes should take into account the potential effects of 
patronage in procuring human resources. Decentralization heightens the politics in civil service 
management. 
vii. The short and renewable term of office for members of recruitment agencies breeds 
opportunities for local politicians to influence their selection decisions.  
viii. Limited career opportunities for local government staff, coupled with low pay, militates against 
attraction and retention of qualified staff. 
ix. The location of local governments affects their capacity to attract and retain quality staff to 
deliver mandated services and this leads to gaps in delivery of services.  
x. Retention of civil servants is integral to the performance of local governments. 
Recommendations and policy issues 
From the above conclusions, the following recommendations can be made. 
Government should fix the pay problem in the public service to enable local governments attract and 
retain the human resource needed to deliver the decentralized services. 
• Central government should emphasise merit-based appointment as part of a national 
development strategy aimed at economic growth and equity.  This could be achieved through:  
 Making it mandatory for central service commissions (Public Service Commission, Education 
Service Commission and Health Service Commission) to be involved in recruitment of middle 
and senior local government officials (those from  U4 to U1E salary scales) falling within 
their sectors rather than the current requirement of only using guidelines from the central 
service commissions. Guidelines are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee compliance 
with them. 
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 Introducing selection tests/examinations to complement oral interviews in selection.  Owing 
to limited capacity of local governments in designing selection tests, the Selection Systems 
Department of the Public Service Commission should be mandated to set, administer and 
mark the tests. 
 Enhancing appreciation by politicians, members of the DSCs and the general public of merit-
based recruitment principles through training and sensitization. 
 Amending the Local Government Act to provide for a single and longer term of office for 
members of the DSC. 
 Strengthening compliance inspection of DSCs by the Ministry of Local Government and the 
Public Service Commission. 
• Sacking and prosecuting members of DSCs that breach minimum recruitment standards and 
engage in other irregularities. The current practice of IGG and PSC ordering DSCs to rescind 
irregular appointments does not act as a deterrent. 
• Attractive conditions of employment should be designed for staff of local governments in 
hard to reach areas. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the implications of decentralization for civil service 
management, and the extent to which civil service issues impact on the effectiveness of 
decentralization. Unless civil service issues are addressed, the efficacy of decentralization will be 
undermined. Despite a range of civil service management issues that have been raised in the paper, 
the separate personnel system is the most appropriate personnel arrangement for  local governments 
under decentralization by devolution. The alternative personnel arrangements tend to be viewed by 
local governments with a high degree of scepticism. In fact local governments may perceive staff 
operating under integrated or unified systems as having been imposed on them. In such systems, ‘you 
are not our employee’ attitude on the part of local elected leaders cannot be avoided. Hence, policy 
makers should mainly focus on fixing the challenges being experienced by local governments under a 
separate personnel system. There is truism in the statement that a problem is solved by identifying the 
forces that sustain it and accordingly weakening them. In this regard, policy makers need to identify 
the context specific factors that account for patronage in civil service appointments and failure by 
local governments to attract staff and accordingly weaken them. Continued appointment of staff based 
on patronage networks and huge staffing gaps in local governments definitely affect the effectiveness 
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of decentralization. National development visions are likely to elude African countries unless merit-
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